Afghanistan, 2001–2021
Afghanistan’s slide from insurgency in a democratic nation to all-out civil war has moved on apace. Perhaps wise heads in Washington are puzzled that the ANA has been so thoroughly ineffective at holding the district centres and urban areas of Afghanistan and especially Pashtun areas.
To understand what is happening, I’d suggest to start with “Afgansty”. The book gives a thorough treatment of the country from the last days of Zahir Shah to the USSR’s final, low-key withdrawal without ceremony. The historical context is invaluable, and the similarities striking.
When I served in Afghanistan with 3 Commando Brigade in 2008–2009, we had fairly recently (2001) stepped into a civil war on the side of the Northern Alliance. Typically Tajiks, Uzbeki, and Hazara, and with their traditional tribal areas in the North of the country, the Northern Alliance had been fighting the controlling Taleban for years. With US military might behind them, the Northern alliance finally had the means to military victory. The civil war quickly became a guerilla war in which the Taleban became as fish, and the sea they swam in was their old heartland of Helmand, Ghazni, Zabol, Kandahar. Under American-made weapon sights, Afghanistan held elections and many headlines were made about this triumph of democratising this nation. The price paid in blood for these headlines and this fantasy has broken families through America, the UK, Australia, Germany, Denmark, and more countries besides. And so long as that price continued to be paid, we could maintain the fantasy that we had bought with it was worth buying.
Before the US era, the Taleban had the upper hand militarily. This was not due to equipment, or motivation, or their enemy not knowing Western-trained fire and manoeuvre drills. The Taleban are a cross-border religious and commercial operation. New recruits are continually being trained in Madrassas across the porous border in Pakistan, and controlling the poppy fields of the southern provinces gives them plenty of funds. The Northern Alliance are a collection of more disparate groups than the Taleban, although made up of brave men, to hold Afghanistan they need to hold Pashtun provinces. And for the ANA as for ISAF, this means operating in foreign tribal lands. Ultimately, we took the losing side and made them the winning side for as long as we were there to lend our might to theirs.
In 2008, before I had written my memoir “On Dusty Plains”, then-governor of Helmand Province Mohamad Gulab Mangal made a bold prediction; that following ISAF troops’ withdrawal, it would take the Taleban 24 hours to retake Helmand. ISAF condemned those remarks at the time and dismissed it as puff to secure more reconstruction funds, manpower, and equipment for the province. Now it transpires that an Afghan knows how to read the tea leaves of his country better than ISAF planners and Western politicians. This was Britain’s 4th foray into Afghanistan. I hope that the lessons of the past are learned before we embark on a 5th.
By Charles Addison, Author.
